and 1988, giving the president wider authority and discretion in dealing with "unjustifiable" or "discriminatory" foreign trade practices.
Against this background, the Reagan administration initiated a series of trade talks with the United States's principal trading partners on marketopening measures. The ramifications of these trade talks, however, extend beyond the simple idea of regulating imports or exports. Trade negotiations often impact the interests of powerful economic sectors on both sides, and directly or indirectly affect a government's broader objectives such as employment, economic growth, and welfare distribution. They stimulate interest groups that are much more muted on other international negotiations, and the competition of those opposing interests and policy goals, either within the economies or between them, creates an intricate dilemma for the negotiators, who try to maintain balance amid the diverse forces. Frequently, the negotiation process involves extensive tradeoffs of various political-economic interests in the nexus of domestic and foreign contexts-a subject of significant theoretical import in economics and politics.
This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and processes underlying trade negotiations by examining a typical case: the trade talks between the United States and Taiwan. Since the mid-1970s, trade between the two countries has expanded, and especially since the early 1980s with the balance consistently in favor of Taiwan. With its immense foreign reserves-second only to Japan's in the late 1980s-and its huge trade surplus with the U.S., Taiwan became one of the natural targets for the new American policy.
Under the Reagan administration, a series of negotiations were conducted aiming to redress the trade imbalance through bilateral arrangements.
In analyzing the complexity of the interest competition in the negotiations, the pluralist perspective is used as the article's theoretical model. Conventional wisdom of the pluralist perspective argues that a government's policies and positions in foreign economic affairs basically reflect the distribution of power or preferences among domestic groups. The holding or rejecting of specific foreign economic policy positions is a function of domestic pressure politics, and is played out between the official representatives and the various social or bureaucratic groups related to the issues in dispute.
This perspective has been further expanded by Robert Putnam, who developed a two-level game metaphor to examine the interactions of domestic politics and international pressures in bilateral negotiations.' According to Putnam, a set of intertwined domestic and international negotiations exist in which it is impossible to reach agreement in an international negotiation without some kind of overlapped "win-sets"-that is, the sets of all possible international arrangements that are acceptable to the domestic constituents of both sides. For Putnam, the size of the "win-set" depends primarily on domestic institutions and structures, although in some cases these factors may be subject to manipulation by the negotiators. Two of the factors are most pertinent to this study: the distribution of constituent preferences and the participation of organized interests.
The distribution of preferences might vary with issues, whose potential to split a society can be quite different. For instance, issues such as the promotion of a country's exports, which expands its economy and wealth but has no adverse effects on other domestic sectors, are less likely to raise domestic controversies. On these "homogeneous" issues, domestic constituents share similar preferences and enjoy a high degree of consensus. In such cases, to maximize the chance of domestic ratification of the negotiated agreements, negotiators tend to follow a hard-bargain, "the more, the better" approach, which in fact reduces the size of the win-set. Conversely, when constituent preferences are more heterogeneous-when international agreements might have uneven domestic effects-negotiators may find that some of their own people become the "silent allies" of their opponents. In these cases, the presence of transnational coalitions will moderate the negotiators' positions and expand their win-sets; consequently, it becomes easier to reach an international agreement.
The participation of organized interests in the negotiation process will also affect the size of the win-set. When the costs/benefits of negotiations are relatively concentrated on a few sectors or when issues are highly politicized, the interests concerned will mobilize to defend their well-being. Their active participation in the process then minimizes the autonomy of the negotiators, limits the negotiators' maneuvering space, and reduces the size of the winset. Hence, negotiations that are highly politicized on both sides tend to end in stalemate.
In a way, this two-level metaphor represents an effort to predict negotiating strategies and behaviors from different situations of "intra-organizational bargaining."2 Presumably, negotiations are most difficult in cases of high interest homogeneity and mobilization, for they generate the least win-sets. Comparing the patterns of negotiating behaviors/strategies in these three types of issues will allow us to understand their variations due to underlying differences in preference distribution and interest mobilization.
Agricultural-IPR Issues
Generally speaking, Taiwan usually took a "legalistic" negotiating approach on agricultural issues to command the high moral ground. In the face of strong American market-opening pressures, its negotiators directly chal- American negotiators argued that given Taiwan's recent strength in foreign investment and technological innovation, Taiwanese companies would actually benefit from strong legal protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
There are plenty of examples of this kind of legalistic vs. economic exchange in negotiation records but it seemed that these arguments were used by both sides simply to defend and justify their predetermined positions. Negotiations on the agricultural-IPR issues were the most controversial and confrontational; true dialogue did not seem to exist, and few compromises were made following the exchanges. The negotiating processes were marked by rigidness and inflexibility, and the uncompromising attitudes of the negotiators often led to deadlocks. In Putnam's terms, these are the negotiations in which there are no overlapping win-sets. The farmers' problems were well publicized by the media, invoking a good deal of sympathy from the general public. Opening the market to American farm products was frequently portrayed as yielding to imperialist pressures. The intransigence on both sides was further reinforced by homogeneous interest structures. For the United States, the promotion of agricultural exports and protection of American intellectual property rights incur no domestic costs, for no social groups will be hurt by the pursuit of these policies. In
Taiwan, the government's positions on agri-IPR issues were not directly chal- Taken together, the U.S.-Taiwan agri-IPR negotiations resemble "distributive bargaining" in which negotiators, viewing the bargaining structure as a zero-sum game, are reluctant to make concessions.8 The intransigence is manifested in such competitive bargaining behavior as warning, bluffing, and threatening. The behavior in these negotiations can indeed be attributed to the characteristics of the issues-high interest homogeneity and strong societal penetration-which create an environment highly adverse to reaching agreement. As no compromise or concession was obtained in the process, agri-IPR negotiations often reached a stalemate.
However, as pressure from the dissatisfied farm sector continued to mount, American negotiators were forced to use coercive tactics to break the bargaining deadlock. Interestingly, each time the Section 301 threat was used, it effectively changed the dynamics of the process by transforming Taiwan's domestic interest structure from homogeneity to heterogeneity. The cigarette and wine talks in 1986 illustrate this point. After several unsuccessful negotiations, the U.S. declared that if Taiwan continued to shut out American cigarettes and wine from its market, then Taiwan' s footwear, textiles, or computer exports would be targets for 301 retaliation. Not surprisingly, the announcement stirred apprehension, even panic in Taiwan's export sectors which, unwilling to be sacrificed for the cigarette and wine industries, launched their own lobby to persuade the government to accept the American demands.9 Thus, the effect of the 301 threat was to transform an international dispute into a domestic one, with Taiwan's export sector competing with its agricultural sector and putting the Taiwan authorities in the awkward position of having to choose between them.
Although the hardliners still preferred no concession, the effective counterlobby from the export sectors-the economic lifeline of Taiwan's export-oriented economy-eventually gained the upper hand. Taiwan finally gave in and signed the cigarette and wine act. As noted earlier, the U.S.
repeated the 301 threat in ensuing agricultural talks whenever negotiations led nowhere, and each time Taiwan modified its positions and made lastminute concessions. The powerful effect of the threat can be explained from the perspective of the newly created heterogeneous interest structure. In the case of insurance, Taiwan agreed in April 1987 to grant licenses to qualified U.S. insurance companies but restricted the number of licenses issued each year to four and the kinds of business in which these companies can engage (two for life and two for nonlife insurance). In addition, American insurers were not allowed to invest in the local stock or real estate markets on the ground that the influx of their capital might destabilize the small local markets. In transportation, Taiwan allowed U.S. carriers to operate as their own container terminal operators, shipping agencies, and sea cargo forwarders but retained its ban on foreign ownership of trucking operations, which was considered by Taiwan as a national security issue that might affect its ability to mobilize troops and resources during wartime. Taken together, incrementalism characterized Taiwan's bargaining behavior in these issue negotiations.
A similar middle-of-the-road approach was adopted by the American nego- The pursuit of incremental changes by both sides can be explained by the lack of interest mobilization in the service sectors. On these issues, the societal inputs and constraints on both sides played a far less important role than in the agri-IPR negotiations. In Taiwan Given its comprehensive and complete control of these sectors, the government does not leave much room for interest groups to organize or maneuver.
The conventional view of Taiwan's "strong state-weak society" fits quite well in this issue category. The strong state and weak private groups, however, do not add up to a homogeneous interest structure. Within the government itself, disagreements abound. In fact, most of the internal policy debates and discussions were marked by bureaucratic competition.
Taiwan's financial-monetary authority has a reputation for policy inertia, and is inclined to reject all American demands for change. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economics is more sympathetic to free trade ideas that can streamline and modernize Taiwan's economic structures, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally emphasizes the importance of maintaining a friendly Taiwan-U.S. relationship. Consequently, incrementalism, which accommodates some of the American demands but buys more time and breathing space for Taiwan, was the product of internal bureaucratic compromise in this kind of heterogeneous interest structure. In the absence of social penetration, this easily becomes official policy.
On the other hand, the societal pressure exerted on American negotiators was not as strong as that in the agri-IPR issues. The banks, insurance corpo- Moreover, interest distributions in service issues are not entirely homogeneous in the United States. Although opening Taiwan's service market is a desirable goal, American negotiators do not want to press the issues too hard.
They acknowledge that a sudden massive restructuring of Taiwan's service industries, especially for those in the financial sector, might disrupt the island's whole financial system, possibly destabilizing the political balance.
Thus, their concern in maintaining Taiwan as a stable force in East Asia complicates their interest calculations and helps moderate their positions and demands. 10
To summarize, the much more accommodating and responsive behavior on both sides in the service negotiations can be explained by their domestic interest patterns. In the absence of penetration by interest groups in the negotiating process, negotiators enjoy greater freedom to adjust or modify their positions in searching for acceptable compromises in a somewhat heterogeneous bureaucratic structure. This explains why the 301 retaliation threat was used only once by the U.S. amid so many intricate problems.
Manufacture Issues
During the time-span of this study, the U.S. asked Taiwan to add steel, machine tool, and the long-standing textile issues to the agenda and to negoti- The formality-oriented bargaining approach reflects the American negotiators' strategy to solve this dilemma. The U.S. would concede the nationalistic argument by pushing for broader frames of protectionism (the quota and VRA systems) but simultaneously retain some free trade ideas by making substantive concessions to its trading partners, and indirectly to some domestic groups, on technical grounds. It was the only way in which negotiators could reconcile the domestic heterogeneous interests.
Taken together (see Table 2 
